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Mark A. Sargent*

I.

Introduction: Can Catholic Social Thought Help Us Understand Corporations and
the Law of Corporations?

The threshold question for legal scholars contemplating Catholic Social Thought (CST) is
whether CST can help us in our two principal tasks as legal scholars: describing the operation of
the legal system and prescribing how the legal system should operate. Those of us interested in the
law of corporations and other business associations,1 and the closely-related field of securities
regulation should ask whether CST can add anything to our understanding of how the relevant law
operates and to the recommendations we make about that operation. In particular, we should ask
whether CST provides a basis for critique of the norms operative in corporate law theory.
On a superficial level, the answer to that question is easy. CST can provide a normative
framework on the basis of which we can perform our descriptive and prescriptive tasks. In that
sense, CST is not functionally different from the other normative frameworks, either
acknowledged or unacknowledged, that inform our work on legal issues, whether those
frameworks are utilitarian, pragmatic, critical, “progressive” or something else. When we get
down to the hard work of articulating and applying CST as a normative framework, however, the
question becomes more difficult. There are conceptual and practical problems that make it
difficult to explain precisely how CST can operate as such a framework for understanding the law
of corporations.
For Catholic legal scholars this question of “how” is an urgent one, because for us CST is
not just another possible normative framework that we can choose or not choose to take seriously
based on intellectual persuasiveness, our curiosity, or fashion. CST is wound intricately into our
beliefs and deeply rooted in the Gospel and Catholic natural law traditions. It is thus potentially
a challenge to our assumptions about how law should operate. This does not mean that we need to
treat every iteration of the social tradition as incontrovertible truth. To the contrary, CST is by
definition a sphere of prudential judgment in which we try to discern the meaning of our faith for
complex questions of social and economic life. It thus allows for disagreement, change and
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development in understanding.2 But CST does embody a coherent world view centered on the
core principles of human dignity, the common good, the reciprocity of rights and obligations, the
contingency of property rights, solidarity, subsidiarity, and the preferential option for the poor.3
These are not merely a series of well-meaning platitudes. They have substantive content that
should influence how choices are made in the real social and economic worlds. Taking those
principles seriously means that Catholic corporate law scholars are faced with the challenge of
understanding how CST can be translated into a normative framework for a critical understanding
of current corporate law theory. Non-Catholic corporate law scholars also may find that CST
principles will resonate with purely secular critiques of the dominant corporate law theoretical
paradigm.
A.

The Problem of Translation

How does one translate the broad moral norms established in papal documents and bishops'
statements into guiding legal principles for the resolution of specific legal problems in the law of
corporations? While those documents and statements obviously concern themselves with the
goals of economic life, the organization of economic institutions, the relationship between labor
and capital, and the moral constraints upon capitalism, they operate at a level of considerable
generality. They also usually avoid making specific policy recommendations, recognizing the
hierarchy's limited expertise, leaving questions of application to the prudential judgment and
moral discernment of the laity. While CST can provide a set of relevant moral norms, much
groundwork needs to be done before we can construct a CST theory of the corporation and a
CST-inspired method of resolving problems in the law of corporations. Doing that groundwork
will require, however, recognition of some major disagreements within the CST tradition itself
which are particularly relevant to understanding how the question of the corporation and
corporation law should be approached.
B.

Whose CST?

One of the consequences of the general and open-ended quality of the key CST documents,
and the consequent deferral to the laity's judgment in interpreting and applying CST principles to
concrete problems, is a wide diversity of opinion about what CST means or requires. CST, of
course, cannot be situated on a traditional left/right axis. It is a distinctive body of thought with its
own goals, premises and core values. Some of its aspects tend to resonate with the left, such as its
communitarian ethos and concern with the excesses of capitalism, and other aspects appeal to the
right, such as its insistence on the dignity of life (including unborn life) and the way the principle
of subsidiarity supports a limited conception of state power. CST arrives at those positions,
however, for reasons that may have little to do with the philosophical premises of the secular
political left or right. CST criticizes capitalism, for example, because its modern manifestations
2
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contribute to a soul-less, materialistic, isolating consumer culture violative of true human dignity,
not because CST inherently favors state ownership of the means of production. CST's concept of
subsidiarity, however, recognizes a vigorous role for government in promoting social justice.
While not socialistic in its premises, subsidiarity insists that higher authorities (such as
governments) have a responsibility to pursue justice when subordinate (i.e., private) authorities are
unwilling or unable to do so. Even more important, CST resists characterization as “left” or
“right,” because it is a coherent, organic whole, with its unique elements intended to be
interdependent and mutually reinforcing.
CST has, however, developed something that can be called left and right wings, for want
of better labels. These wings result from varying emphasis on different parts of CST, and reflect
the ideological predispositions brought to the understanding of CST. Sometimes the process of
interpretation is little more than superficial, highly selective cherry-picking of CST concepts (or
rhetoric), to buttress positions the interpreter already holds. Sometimes the tilt to the right or the
left results from principled convictions about what CST (or, more generally, Catholicism or
Christianity) “really” means. This can turn into a bitter controversy over which version of CST is
more “authentically” Catholic, a controversy reflecting fundamental disagreements among
Catholics today about what it means to be Catholic that amount to a culture war. Compare, for
example, Michael Perry,4 who noted that “authentically Christian premises do not yield Burkean
social conservatism” and Paul Tillich, who stated that socialism “is the only possible economic
system from the Christian point of view,”5 with Michael Novak6 and the writers associated with
the Acton Institute,7 who derive a profoundly anti-statist emphasis on the free market from CST
and Christian principles generally.
CST's vulnerability (if that is the proper word) to highly disparate, ideologically conflicting
interpretations and applications is particularly evident in the thinking about CST's meaning for the
corporation and the law of corporations. Indeed, two competing visions have developed, which
collectively show both the potential fruitfulness and the unsettled nature of CST as a normative
framework for thinking about law. One of those visions, perhaps the one usually associated with
CST, is essentially communitarian. The other rejects many of the premises of the communitarian
vision, and regards them as secular, leftist intrusions into genuinely Catholic thought. It
emphasizes, instead, the importance of liberty, especially economic liberty, to the flourishing of
the human person. My purpose in this paper is to outline those competing visions, and to ask what
the emergence of such contrasting views from CST has to tell us about the meaning of CST for the
law. My conclusion will be that the vision of the corporation articulated by Michael Novak and
other Catholic neo-conservatives, and put forward as a genuine, indeed the most genuine
expression of CST, is actually based on a highly selective, ideologically driven and ultimately
misleading reading of CST. As such, Novak’s understanding of the corporation (and its
relationship to the state) does not provide a reliable basis for discerning CST’s meaning for
4
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corporate law. Of greater potential interest is the work of Stephen Bainbridge, who aligns himself
with Novak, but who uses the analytical tools of law and economics to critique in a more
sophisticated and concrete way both the communitarian norms and specific applications of CST.
Whether Bainbridge has positioned himself as a critical voice within the social tradition, or against
the tradition, remains to be determined. Resolving that question will be important to determining
CST’s potential relevance for corporate law.
II.

The Communitarian Vision
A.

The Corporation as a Community and In the Community

The mainstream CST vision of the corporation is communitarian. This vision derives from
a cluster of CST concepts. The key concept is anthropological: an understanding of the human
person as essentially social. As a social being, the person is not merely an autonomous bearer of
rights, but part of a community that should be ordered toward the common good, and in which
rights and duties are reciprocal. In this view, property and profits are not evil, but are not ends in
themselves; they are instrumental to genuine human flourishing and for the production of the
common good. These concepts are central to a notion of the corporation as a community, in which
the profit motive, while entirely legitimate, is essentially just an “indicator that a business is
functioning well.”8 In this vision, the corporation is an institution: (i) that must be dedicated to the
flourishing of its employees as human beings; (ii) in which the shareholders' rights of ownership
are constrained by duties to others within the corporate community; (iii) whose managers must
concern themselves with the common good; and (iv) which, as a matter of Christian anthropology,
must produce not just wealth, but the conditions under which human persons may flourish
spiritually.9 This approach recognizes that the corporation will still be faced with tragic choices
that may result in adverse consequences for some stakeholders, but it insists that communal values,
and the conditioned, reciprocal nature of rights be taken seriously as those choices are made. An
image of the corporation as a human community has been developed eloquently in Professor Scott
FitzGibbon's10 work, as well as in the work of economists and business ethicists drawing on the
Catholic Social tradition.11
8
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The communitarian vision is also manifest in CST conceptions of the corporation in the
community. This conception of the corporation in the community is complex. At its most general
level, it draws on Pope John Paul II's critique of capitalism.12 To the extent that the corporation's
determined pursuit of profit transforms greed into a virtue, and treats acquisition of wealth as an
end in itself, it contributes to the spiritual emptiness of a materialistic culture and undermines the
common good. One of the principal themes of the Pope has been the ongoing tension between
modern capitalism and Christian anthropology that results from capitalism's tendency to
instrumentalize human persons rather than treat them as an end in themselves.13 The Pope's deeply
personalist view of the meaning of work, which insists on the priority of the subjective experience
of work, leads him to insist upon a subordination of the pursuit of profit to the creation of a
participatory community.14
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John Paul II describes this alienation in business as ensuring “maximum returns and profits with no
concern whether the worker, through his own labor, grows or diminishes as a person.” This
alienation in part stems from persons' refusal to transcend themselves by instrumentalizing
everything, including their own relationships, within the firm. For example, managers treat
employees well not because they are created in the image of God, but because it will maximize
shareholder wealth. This pervasive logic of instrumentalization within corporations today obstructs
the habits of mind and heart by which persons authentically give themselves to God and others.
Id. at 12.
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Elshtain, supra note 9, at 34. For criticism of the CST valorization of labor participation in workplace governance, see
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Decisionmaking and the Moral Rights of Employees: Participatory Management
and Natural Law, 43 VILL L. REV. 741 (1998) [hereinafter Corporate Decisionmaking]. Bainbridge argues, inter alia,
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At a more specific level, the corporation's social responsibilities within the community are
a major theme of the communitarian vision. Those responsibilities extend from concern for
environmental stewardship to prevention of global labor inequality to non-cooperation with
oppressive or racist government regimes, and include much more.15 The vision also may include
a critique of globalization, and a tendency to identify large multinational corporations as prime
actors in an economic movement seen as an affront to solidarity.16
In short, the communitarian vision of the corporation as a community and in the
community includes a critical set of assumptions about how corporations should operate. This
critical posture is evident in the specific communitarian recommendations for corporate law.
B.

Implications for Corporate Law

The CST communitarian vision of the constitution has two major, related implications for
the law of corporations. First, its sense of the corporation as an actor in the community encourages
a robust view of corporate social responsibility. In this view, the corporation's responsibilities as
a social actor extend beyond mere compliance with the external framework of laws relating to
labor, the environment, safety and health regulation and the like. This view rejects the
presumption that corporations should be required only to obey the laws constituting the vast (and
costly) web of regulatory constraints surrounding corporations. Instead, the law of corporate
governance should create structures, incentives and penalties designed to ensure corporate
awareness of and accountability for its social responsibilities: a legally-constituted social
conscience. Legal rules designed to foster a greater sense of corporate social responsibility, even
at the expense of profit to the shareholders, are, from this perspective, essential if corporations are
to contribute to the common good, rather than use their vast power to undermine it.
Perhaps the best example of this concept of corporate governance is the activity of the
Catholic religious orders, who use their status as shareholders under the Securities and Exchange
Commission's proxy rules17 governing shareholder proposals to place a variety of social justice
concerns (themselves derived from CST principles) on corporate management's proxy
statements.18 Such social justice resolutions rarely generate enough shareholder votes to be
approved, but they have the effect of publicizing the company's involvement in questionable social
practices, focusing shareholders' attention on the issue, and placing the issue more firmly on
15
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management's agenda. An example would be a shareholder resolution criticizing the company's
environmental practices and requiring management to change them. The resolution itself
expresses the CST notion of responsibility for stewardship of creation; its placement on the
corporate agenda reflects the CST vision of corporate responsibility for the common good. In the
communitarian vision, therefore, the SEC proxy rules are an appropriate use of government
intervention to promote corporate engagement with the common good.19
This robust vision of the corporation's responsibilities carries with it consequences for how
the corporation should be governed. It is not much of a conceptual leap from the assumption that
a corporation should be governed in a way that enhances its sense of responsibility to the external
community to the assumption that it should be governed as if it were itself a community. What
links both assumptions is an even more fundamental one: corporations should be managed not just
to maximize shareholder wealth, but to meet their external and internal communal responsibilities.
In other words, the communitarian vision breaks sharply with the shareholder wealth
maximization norm that prevails in current economic theory and legal doctrine.20 In this vision,
19
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the corporation is governed for the benefit of a range of all the human persons involved in the
corporate enterprise, which is conceptualized as a community in which stakeholders such as
employees have more than a contractual claim. In this vision, furthermore, stakeholders' selfish
interests do not simply replace or add themselves to shareholders' selfish interests. There is a shift
in emphasis away from wealth maximization as an end in itself, and towards creating the
conditions of human flourishing in a broader, relational sense. Managers must do more than
mediate among interest groups; they must strive to identify and act upon what is the common
good.21
The norm contested by this version of CST is well established. In its simplest form, the
shareholder wealth maximization norm holds that corporate managers should strive to increase
shareholder wealth, not that of other corporate stakeholders. Corporate law theory divides over the
best means of maximizing shareholder wealth, particularly in light of the agency problem:
managers' tendency to maximize their own wealth, rather than the shareholders'. There are sharp
debates over the relative advantages of mandatory rules versus enabling rules in state corporate
law, the need for federal regulation of public corporations, the proper limits of private contracting,
whether legal rules should facilitate or hinder corporate takeovers, and whether corporate
governance should be controlled by managers, directors or shareholders.22 All these debates,
however, are over a common question: how does law best maximize shareholder value? Only at

regulation can never bring corporate results and perceived social goals into congruence.”).
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what each group wants for itself, but on what is normatively good for that group and for others.
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the margins is the shareholder wealth maximization norm questioned.23
The communitarian vision, in contrast, questions that norm directly. By conceptualizing
the corporation as a community, it posits managers' responsibility to manage the corporation for
the benefit of the non-shareholder members of its community, as well as in the interest of the
shareholders. This position expresses the CST concept that profits, while essential to the success
of the corporation, are merely instrumental, and not the ultimate purpose of the corporation, thus
implicitly rejecting, or at least de-emphasizing the shareholder wealth maximization norm.24
Supporting devaluation of that norm is CST's understanding of shareholders' property rights as
enmeshed in a web of reciprocal duties, and that protection of such rights is appropriate only to the
extent that such protection contributes to the common good.25
The CST communitarian vision of the corporation is also at odds with the widely-accepted
Coasean theory of the corporate firm as a nexus of contracts.26 The “corporation,” in this view, is
a convenient legal fiction for the intersection of providers of debt and equity capital, labor,
managerial services and other inputs into an enterprise that is “collective” only in an instrumental
23
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Profitability and efficiency are worthy goals because their realization is foundational to the
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They account neither for the ultimate motivation of our work nor for the first principles of the
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what really motivate us.
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sense, with the participants bound to each other only contractually, and bound within a firm, rather
than across markets, because of the economic efficiency of organizing production in that manner.
If corporate stakeholders' rights are conceived in and determined by contract, there would be little
room for an argument that there are non-contractual claims derived from membership in the
corporate community that managers must honor. Indeed, the belief that a corporation is only a
nexus of contracts, and not a human community bonded by extra-contractual ties, may be regarded
as the very antithesis of the CST understanding of the corporation as a community. The largest
challenge for this understanding, however, is finding a meaningful way to talk about the public
corporation, with its highly fluid set of stakeholders, most of which have very specific, impersonal
and often transient relationships to the corporation, as a “community.”
This version of CST thus has much in common with those strains of “progressive”
corporate law theory27 that emphasize the need for legal and regulatory structures that would
institutionalize a broad sense of corporate social responsibility beyond mere law compliance. It
would also cut through current arguments among corporate law theorists about the best way to
maximize shareholder value - - enhancement of managerial discretion, board empowerment, or
facilitating shareholder participation in governance - - by proposing a broader conception of the
purposes of corporate enterprise and of the common good as the focus of corporate
decisionmaking.
III.

The Argument From Liberty
A.

Michael Novak's Theology of the Corporation

What I have called the communitarian vision of CST might be called a “left
communitarian” vision, although I have argued that the traditional right/left dichotomy does not fit
Catholic teaching very well. We may, however, call this vision “left,” because some of its
sympathies and antipathies point in that direction: a comfort with restraints on the exercise of
property rights and government intervention in economic decisions and a critical attitude toward
the excesses of capitalism. Its character is best revealed, however, by contrast to the version of
CST articulated most strongly by Michael Novak in his very different reading of the meaning of
“communitarian” for economic life in general and the corporation in particular.28 His grounding
of CST in a theological, political and economic concept of the liberty of the individual produces
27
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not just a very different philosophical emphasis or tone in discussions of the corporation,29 but
very different policy prescriptions. Novak's body of thought is often in tension with what the
bishops and other proponents of CST believe that the tradition means,30 although he believes that
his vision is deeply consistent with that of Pope John Paul II.31
While articulated at length in several works, Novak's basic argument is straightforward.
For Novak, the corporation is an extraordinarily important invention. Indeed, it is “an invention
of law that made democratic capitalism possible.”32 Democratic capitalism, he argues, is what
lifted humanity out of immemorial poverty, recurrent famine and stasis by replacing traditional
societies with a differentiation of society into three systems: a political system, an economic
system and a moral-cultural system, each essentially independent of the other.33 This
differentiation was critical because it created the conditions of individual liberty essential to
creativity, change and development. This idea:
interprets human society as so composed by the Creator that its greatest source of social dynamism is the
imagination, initiative and liberty of the human individual. It is an idea whose express purpose is to increase
the material wealth of all nations, at the very least eliminating famine and poverty.34

Historically, the corporation was crucial to the success of democratic capitalism.
The most original social invention of democratic capitalism, in sum, is the private corporation founded for
economic purposes. The motivation for this invention was also social: to increase “the wealth of nations,” to
generate (for the first time in human history) sustained economic development. This effect was, in fact,
achieved. However, the corporationCas a type of voluntary associationCis not merely an economic
institution. It is also a moral institution and a political institution. It depends upon and generates certain
moral-cultural virtues; it depends upon and generates new political forms. In two short centuries, it has
brought about an immense social revolution. It has moved the center of economic activity from the land to
industry and commerce. No revolution is without social costs and sufferings, which must be entered on the
ledger against benefits won. Universally, however, the idea of economic development has now captured the
imagination of the human race. This new possibility of development has awakened the world from its
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economic slumber.35

This passage sounds one of Novak’s principal themes: the corporation is not just a thing to be used
instrumentally, for good or ill. It is a “moral institution.” While Novak’s language is sometimes
unclear, he verges on arguing that the corporation is intrinsically good, particularly when
contrasted to the state, for which Novak reserves his deepest suspicions.
Having been the social instrument by which the bourgeoisie, in “scarce one hundred years, has created more
massive and more colossal productive forces than all preceding generations together," the publicly held
business corporation is arguably the most successful, transformative, and future-oriented institution in the
modern world. It has been far more open, more creative, and infinitely less destructive than the nation-state,
particularly the totalitarian state.36

The significance of the corporation for Novak, however, lies beyond its contribution to the
rise of political capitalism. The corporation's real significance is theological: “the modern
business corporation [is] a much despised incarnation of God's presence in the World.”37 In his
principal statement of this position, Toward a Theology of the Corporation, he finds seven “signs
of grace” in the corporation:

35

$

Creativity. “The agency through which inventions and discoveries are made is the
corporation. Its creativity makes available to mass markets the riches long hidden
in Creation. Its creativity mirrors God's. That is the standard by which its deeds
and misdeeds are properly judged.”38

$

Liberty. “The corporation mirrors God's presence also in its liberty, by which
[Novak] mean[s] independence from the state.”39

$

Social Motive. “The fundamental intention of the [corporate] system from the
beginning has been the wealth of all humanity.”40

$

Social Character. “For many millions of religious persons, the daily milieu in
which they work out their salvation is the communal, corporate world of the
workplace.”41

Id. at 56.
NOVAK, ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 29, at 3.
37
NOVAK, TOWARD A THEOLOGY OF THE CORPORATION, supra note 29, at 39. It is not entirely clear what Novak
means by the phrase “incarnation of God’s presence.” Is it meant literally to define the corporation as being as aspect
of the Incarnation? That would require some explanation. Or, is it meant to describe the corporation as a
manifestation of God’s grace, and hence as a sign of God’s presence in the world? If so, why is it any more such a sign
than any other human creation? The corporation, like the state, has been a powerful instrument for producing the
foundational goods essential for human flourishing. Whether one or the other is more of a sign of God’s grace is open
to question, although it is not clear that the question is an important one, given the tragic extent to which each has been
treated as an end in itself in many different historical circumstances.
38
Id. at 44.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 46.
41
Id. at 47.
36

$

Insight. “The primary capital of any corporation is insight, invention, finding a
better way.”42

$

Liberty and Election. “The corporation operates in a world of no scientific
certainty, in which corporate leaders must constantly make judgments about reality
when not all the evidence about reality is in.”43

In these seven ways, Novak concludes, “corporations offer metaphors of grace, a kind of
insight into God's ways in history,” and are places of great moral and theological, as well as
historical and economic significance.
Novak's theology is more than a little wobbly. How does corporate creativity “mirror”
God’s grace? What precisely is “incarnational” about the corporation as distinct from any other
human creation? At times, such is his enthusiasm that his “theology of the corporation” verges on
an idolatry of the corporation that does not even admit the possibility of critique. Novak does,
however, propose an internally coherent view of how the corporation should be viewed by
Christians:
$

The corporation is a crucial locus for the playing out of God-given human liberty.

$

The corporation is an extraordinarily successful instrument for creatively realizing
the riches of God's world for the benefit of humanity, and to “serve human needs,
desires, and rational interests is also to serve human liberty, conscience, and
God.”44

$

The corporation is a communal association that mediates between individuals and
the state, allowing collective action while protecting liberty from the overwhelming
force of the state.

$

The corporation's independence from the state is crucial to its ability to perform
those functions.

It should be obvious that Novak's framing of this vision is a response to socialist and Marxist
theorists who, he claims, would collapse the boundaries between economic, political and
moral-cultural systems essential to Novak's conception of democratic capitalism. His theology of
the corporation is thus both an affirmation of the Christian nature of the capitalist world view (or
the capitalist nature of the Christian world view) and a pointed critique of a socialist (or, generally,
“statist”) world view regarded by some as more essentially Christian.
Novak is particularly concerned with countering Catholic or Protestant thinkers
(particularly clergy) who approach economic life, or criticize corporations, from standpoints that
seem to him particularly misguided. They are often misguided, he frequently points out, because
42
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their education, experience and social prejudices prevent them from really knowing anything
about economics or the business world. Even worse, according to Novak, they are either frankly
socialist, tainted by an anti-capitalist bias common to intellectuals, afflicted by a “lingering
nostalgia” for a Constantinian planned society, in thrall to antique, pre-capitalist notions of
economics, or subject to guilt or sentimental notions about poverty and wealth inequality. These
misconceptions, he argues, have led too many Catholic and Protestant religious leaders and
intellectuals to indulge in criticism of capitalism and corporations that ignores not only their
contributions to human welfare but also their identity as manifestations of God's grace.45 His
repeated condemnation of this strand of religious thought on economic life is sweeping, and
ignores more nuanced religious critiques of capitalism and its effects, most notably that of CST
itself. Nevertheless, he presses his attack even further.
Religious thinkers’ critical attitude toward corporations, he argues, demonstrates a failure
to appreciate the true meaning of community and subsidiarity. For Novak, “community” depends
on the vitality of the many economic, civic, religious and private associations that constrain the
power of the state and mediate between it and individuals vulnerable to its power. This anti-statist
version of communitarianism (a kind of “right communitarianism”) emphasizes how
intermediating associations preserve the tripartite division of the economic, political and
moral-cultural essential to democratic capitalism and limited government.46 The integrity of those
associations and their independence from the state is preserved by adherence to the principle of
subsidiarity as an ordering principle. The business corporation, in Novak's estimation, is perhaps
the most important of those associations.
Novak is concerned, however, with more than countering philosophically what he regards
as the carping about soul-less capitalism emanating from religious quarters. His insistence on the
importance of preserving the independence of corporations leads him to a profoundly
anti-regulatory stance, opposition to conceptions of “social justice” involving legally-mandated
wealth redistribution or concern for non-shareholder constituencies, and interference with the
freedom of corporations to perform their economic functions. This basic stance—valorization of
the corporation, rejection of regulatory or legal restraints on corporate liberty, and disdain for the
state-imposed conceptions of corporate social responsibility—determines his views on how the
law should (or should not) influence the management of corporations.
When focusing directly on current controversies over corporate governance, Novak has
articulated a strongly managerialist position. He begins by drawing a sharp distinction between
government, with all of the checks and balances needed to restrain its power, and governance of a
45
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corporation, which should be designed to support the corporation's nimbleness and creativity.
Wise persons do not want governments to act until they are carried forward, like rhinoceroses rising slowly
from the mud by the hydraulic force of a very large and durable consensus. But the same wise persons want
business corporations to be able to act quickly, even to turn on a dime when they are losing money or when
they spot suddenly arising possibilities, to take the risks for which their investors have entrusted them with
well-defined executive power.47

For Novak, corporate managers should be left free to do what they do best (maximize
profits), and certainly should not be criticized by the envious for their allegedly “obscene”
compensation, or be “played for patsies” by those who “want to socialize the corporations.”48
“Appeasement” of “movements such as environmentalism, the philosophy of stakeholders,
children's rights, and some forms of feminism and gay rights”49 would be succumbing to “former
socialists [who] want to tame the business corporation, make it sit up and dance, perhaps do tricks
to music.”50 Novak urges no concessions:
to causes dear to statists, such as executive pay caps, incentives and mandates to cover training and layoffs,
constraints on internationalization, demands for a Germanic system of “public interest” corporate directors,
and other moves towards the socialization of corporate America.51

It is by no means easy to discern exactly who Novak is complaining about in this passage. Who
exactly are his “statists,” and what exactly is a statist? Are all statists “former socialists?” Would
he include in the “statist” category anyone who conceives of a broader role than he does for
mandatory, rather than enabling rules in corporate governance? Would the category include those
who accept the shareholder wealth maximization norm, but would urge a different balance of
regulatory intervention and deferral to private contracting? In Novak’s Manichean universe, the
common good is served only by the release of legal restraints on economic (particularly
entrepreneurial) energies. Accordingly, any state-imposed rules of corporate governance that
would constrain corporate behavior for any “social” purpose would divert corporations from the
only goal through which they can actually serve the common good: the maximization of
shareholder wealth. In any event, Novak repudiates, emphatically and unambiguously, both the
general approach and specific positions associated with the left communitarian version of CST
thinking about the corporation. Legal rules mandating limits on executive compensation,52
managerial consideration of the interests of non-shareholder constituencies,53 and broader
corporate social responsibility are anathema.54
Novak's analysis of corporate governance nods to Coase and other aspects of economic
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theory,55 but it derives principally from his philosophical emphasis on the centrality of the
independence of the business corporation to democratic capitalism, which he regards as essential
to human liberty, flourishing and dignity. In that manner, he attempts to link a profoundly
anti-statist defense of liberal economics and opposition to legal rules constraining managerial
discretion, to CST theological concepts of the common good, human dignity and incarnational
humanism.
Novak’s encomium to capitalism and the role of the corporation within it presumes a deep
affinity between capitalism and Christianity. For Novak, the communitarian interpretation of the
social tradition is not an organic, authentic expression of the tradition, but a distortion spawned by
leftist bias. Ultimately, he sees himself as vindicating the “real” truth of the tradition. It will be
argued below that he has it exactly backwards.
B.

Beyond Novak: Bainbridge's Integration of Law, Economics and CST

Stephen Bainbridge has published a series of pioneering articles that seek to define the
theoretical relationship between the jurisprudential school of law and economics and CST, and
attempts to apply the two approaches to problems of corporate law in an integrated way that
identifies both affinities and tensions between them. While Bainbridge speaks admiringly of
Novak, employs his rhetoric, and believes his arguments derive from Novak’s, he is actually far
less dependent on grandiose and questionable theological propositions, and far more sophisticated
than Novak in his critical application of economics to CST precepts on the corporation and
corporate law. He thus presents a more serious challenge to the communitarian vision than Novak.
Bainbridge's understanding of law and economics rests on the principle that economic
analysis can be normative, and that the key norm is wealth maximization, so that “law should seek
to increase social wealth, as measured by the dollar equivalents of everything in society.”56 The
threshold question, then, is whether “wealth maximization is an appropriate moral norm on which
a Christian legal scholar may draw.”57 Bainbridge concludes that it indeed is. In an apologia for
the use of law and economics analysis by a Christian scholar, Bainbridge begins with the classic
defense of wealth maximization as a “rising tide [that] lifts all boats,”58 and that “wealth
maximization may be the most direct route to a variety of moral ends.”59 He follows Novak in
asserting that Christian criticism of the norm is often a function of socialist or statist bias in favor
of “aid and comfort to the Leviathan state.”60 He agrees, ultimately, with the proposition that “The
55
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divine plan was indeed that we should enjoy the fruits of the earth and of our own industry, and
[wealth maximization] is the best way we have yet devised to organize the latter.”61
Bainbridge recognizes, however, that a “Christian legal scholar should approach law and
economics . . . [by] viewing the normative claims of economic analysis as merely a subset of the
full panoply of ethical and moral principles by which we are called to live as Christians.”62 He
would thus seem to acknowledge the traditional CST distinction between “foundational” and
“excellent” goods, and thus does not seem to make the kind of categorical mistake on which
Novak constantly verges in his virtually unqualified approbation of the pursuit of wealth. While
Bainbridge thus recognizes in theory that Christian normative values should trump the wealth
maximization norm, he is suspicious of what the implementation of that theory would mean. In
particular, to the extent that Christian values would impose a preference for state-imposed legal
structures promoting wealth redistribution rather than wealth maximization, Bainbridge jumps
ship. Bainbridge does so principally in reliance on public choice theory's premise that most
legislative attempts to redistribute wealth are driven by highly effective special interest groups at
the expense of larger, more diffuse and less effective groups.63 Interpretation of Christian values
as weighted toward state-mandated wealth redistribution would thus seem to him to produce
perverse results. Bainbridge's public choice perspective thus leaves him with significant
reservations about CST's critical posture toward the wealth inequalities generated by capitalism,
as well as its assumption that law should be used to constrain capitalism's production of wealth
inequality.
Bainbridge's ambivalence (or hostility) to the practical consequences of applying CST
norms (particularly through government mandates) is expressed in his consideration of specific
CST positions on issues of corporate governance. In an article64 criticizing the American bishops'
1986 pastoral letter Economic Justice for All,65 Bainbridge identifies and challenges
well-established CST positions favoring labor participation in corporate decisionmaking. While
he denies that his goal is to determine whether those positions are accurate statements of CST or
Catholic doctrine generally,66 he joins Novak in condemning the extrapolation of this particular
policy recommendation from CST principles. His main goal, however, is to determine whether the
CST position should be enacted into positive law, and he answers that question through arguments
from economics and political theory, rather than theology. Bainbridge concludes that the
arguments supporting mandatory labor participation in corporate governance are overbroad, and
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give the concept a centrality it does not deserve.
He rests his conclusion partially on evidence that most workers do not want such
participation and do not particularly benefit from it where it is in effect.67 More theoretically,
Bainbridge objects to the way such mandatory rules reflect social goals inconsistent with the
shareholder wealth maximization norm that he regards as central to corporate law.68 He also draws
on familiar law and economics arguments to predict that mandatory labor representation on boards
would increase agency costs,69 and that firms have sufficient incentives to enter into implicit
contracts protecting employees from possible exploitation by managers.70 His primary theoretical
objection to mandatory participation rules, however, is to the statist character of such intervention.
In critiquing a Bishop's pastoral letter urging participatory governance, Bainbridge argued that:
Despite its democratic rhetoric, Catholic social teaching, as preached by the Bishop's pastoral letter, has a
strong statist slant. Although they do not support nationalizing industry, the Bishop's support of regulation
designed to protect employees and encourage their participation in corporate governance differs only in
degree, and not in kind, from collectivism.71

Bainbridge thus repudiates the tradition within CST that turns to the state as the source of legal
rules intended to foster human dignity. Interestingly, Bainbridge does not rely on Novakian
theology to make this point. He is expressing an essentially libertarian take on the proper
relationship of the state and economic actors.
Having rejected the CST argument favoring mandatory participatory governance,
Bainbridge turned in a later article72 to a related problem: the American bishops' foray in
Economic Justice for All73 into the corporate stakeholder debate. This debate turns on the question
of whether directors should (or must) consider the interests of nonshareholder constituencies.74
Bainbridge summarized the bishops' position in this debate as follows:
The Bishops assert that a board of directors' decisions affect a much broader class of constituency groups than
merely their shareholders. Employees, managers, customers, creditors, suppliers, and communities all
contribute to the enterprise, all have a stake in its success, and all are affected by its actions. Hence, their
interests must be reflected in the corporate decisionmaking process. To be sure, the Bishops acknowledged
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the directors' and officers' legal obligation to maximize shareholder wealth. They argued, however, that
“morally this legal responsibility may be exercised only within the bounds of justice to employees,
customers, suppliers, and the local community.” In other words, corporate decisionmakers have a moral
obligation to balance a decision's impact on stakeholders against its economic impact on shareholders.75

While acknowledging that the Bishops' letter “was not too far out of step with the mainstream,”76
of CST, Bainbridge raises the question of whether this statement best reflects the Catholic social
tradition, suggesting, as have others, that the post-1986 encyclicals Laborem Exercens and
Centesimus Annus, “temper much of what was said in Economic Justice for All.”77 He does not
dwell, however, on the question of whether the Bishop’s letter represents a departure from the
Catholic social tradition. Bainbridge seems mainly concerned with testing whether the bishops'
position holds up when its costs and benefits are measured with the analytical tools of law and
economics. This inquiry, he argues, is an exercise in determining practical reasonableness and
thus entirely consistent with the anti-consequentialist premises of natural law and Christian moral
philosophy.78 He also argues that his dissent from the bishops' positions is an entirely legitimate
exercise of prudential judgment in determining the meaning of Catholic doctrine for economic
life,79 a conclusion which is surely correct. Not surprisingly, Bainbridge concludes emphatically
that the bishops' position constitutes bad public policy and bad corporate law.
The core of his critique is a challenge to the bishops' normative assumptions supporting
their belief that non-shareholder interests should be taken as seriously by directors as shareholder
interests. The bishops assume that the corporations should: (i) function democratically by
allowing all corporate constituents to participate in firm decisions; and (ii) constitute an economic
“community” of shared interests and reciprocal moral duties that fosters each member’s human
dignity. Bainbridge repudiates both normative assumptions. The democratic model, he argues, is
particularly inappropriate for the large public company, which is almost invariably organized
hierarchically for sound economic reasons. Even worse, the communitarian model, “strain[s]
credulity past the breaking point.”80 It simply does not work, he argues, in the context of a large
75
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public corporation, quoting Roberta Romano, who has observed that “[communal] characteristics
cannot survive within large hierarchal corporations, whose dynamics undermine and destabilize
the egalitarian basis of social relationships.”81 The communitarian model is also theoretically
unsound, he concludes, because it is flatly inconsistent with law and economics' understanding of
the corporation as a nexus of contracts.82
Perhaps even more important to Bainbridge is his belief that the equation of
non-shareholders interests with shareholder interests would undermine the shareholder wealth
maximization norm. Because that norm is central to the legal regime within which the corporation
has made “its valuable social contributions,”83 the communitarian model would produce
conceptual confusion. Moreover, a legal system that attempted to force consideration of the
interests of non-shareholders into corporate decisions also would produce more than a theoretical
problem; it would produce the practical problems of increased agency costs to the benefit of
neither shareholder nor other stakeholders.84
Bainbridge's critique of the bishops' position in the stakeholder debate using the analytical
tools of law and economics is thus unremittingly negative, and that critique is the core of his
argument. He also insists, however, that government-mandated consideration of non-shareholder
constituencies would be an affront both as a matter of political philosophy (citing principally Paul
Johnson and Russell Kirk)85 and what he regards as the essential principles of CST. Drawing on
Novak, he regards such government intervention in private decisionmaking as inconsistent with
both the concern for human freedom expressed in Centesimus Annus (as Novak understands it) and
the principle of subsidiarity that protects associations from interference from above.86 While
Bainbridge's attempt to harmonize the premises and methodology of law and economics (as
applied to corporate law) with those of CST (and Catholic thought generally) is the least developed
part of his critique, he does make the Novakian point that a shared concern with human freedom
and economic liberty creates a deeper affinity between economics and CST than does the
“collectivist” left communitarian vision.87
The contrast between the Novak/Bainbridge argument from economic liberty and the more
mainstream communitarian vision of CST is stark. But what does that conflict mean for our
understanding of CST and, specifically, its significance for corporate law?
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IV.

The Meanings of the Conflict

In trying to determine what the conflict between those two competing visions means, I am
not going to offer judgments about Bainbridge's positions in the secular debates over the wealth
maximization norm, the theory of the firm as a nexus of contracts, labor participation in corporate
governance, or corporate directors' responsibilities for non-shareholder constituencies, even
though his positions in these debates lead him to reject mainstream CST positions on the
corporation and economic life. Suffice it to say for purposes of this discussion that his positions
on those issues are controversial in purely secular terms. I will argue, however, that the conflict
between the communitarian vision and Novak’s and Bainbridge’s related, but different critiques
indicates that much fundamental theoretical and practical analysis remains to be done before CST
can be a useful normative framework for understanding corporate law. I reach this conclusion in
view of two problems that emerge from the conflict.
First, Novak’s approach represents, at best, an outlier position in the Catholic social
tradition. It creates fundamental theoretical tensions, and it proposes policies that do not serve the
goals of the tradition. His core principles—the centrality of economic liberty, the social
beneficence of the pursuit of profit, and implacable hostility to government intervention into
economic life (“statism”)—are deeply rooted in the classical liberal tradition. They also resonate
in CST to the extent that the tradition, and particularly Pope John Paul II, recognize the importance
of economic liberty to human liberty and dignity, the legitimacy of the profit motive in the exercise
of human creativity in the production of socially beneficial wealth, the crucial function of private
associations as mediating institutions, and the moral dangers of the welfare state. But these
principles are understood conditionally in the CST tradition in a way foreign to Novak and other
Catholic neoconservatives.
For example, in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis Pope John Paul II recognizes the value of “the
right of economic initiative,” particularly in its importance to the creation of greater wealth, but
insists that such “wealth must be distributed in accord with the demands of human solidarity and
distributive justice.”88 This emphasis on distributional justice is central to Catholic social
teaching, but is usually viewed with suspicion by Novak, because he usually sees distributionist
goals as naive, expressions of leftist bias, or tied to statist intervention.89 Pope John Paul II also
expresses his ambivalence about economic liberty and profit-seeking in Centesimus Annus. As
Charles Curran explains:
On one hand, John Paul II affirms the importance of “initiative and entrepreneurial ability” and recognizes
“the legitimate role of profit.” On the other hand, the state “has the task of determining the juridical
framework within which economic affairs are to be conducted;” the free market alone cannot satisfy
fundamental human needs. Although profit plays a legitimate role, other human and moral factors also have
roles to play.90
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Novak and others91 are thus overstating their case when they assert that “In Centesimus annus
Rome has assimilated American ideas of economic liberty.”92 As David Hollenbach has pointed
out, “It would be a serious mistake to think that the Pope has blessed the form of capitalism
existing in the United States today. In fact, the encyclical is a major challenge to much recent U.S.
economic and social policy.”93 Furthermore, the Pope's criticism of the modern welfare state is not
a criticism of state intervention per se or the goals of social assistance; it is a critique of the state
for relying on impersonal bureaucracies rather than helping foster a more participatory
community.94 Indeed, John Paul II's Laborem Exercens, with its emphasis on the common good,
the social mortgage on private property, and joint ownership of the means of work, sets out a
“vision of a just social order that is best described as a modified form of socialism, built on a new
view of human rights, political and economic democracy, and a demand for moral
self-consciousness and realization, grounded in political/economic rights.”95 This description of
the Pope's vision as “socialism” underestimates his appreciation of private economic initiative, and
Novak is correct in asserting that the Pope and the CST tradition strongly support democratic
capitalism, but it does suggest that Novak is incorrect insofar as he de-emphasizes the Pope's and
the tradition's robustly communitarian message.
Novak and Bainbridge's critique of Economic Justice for All is an example of the profound
division in Catholic circles that the Bishops’ letter generated. The Letter exposed the deep
disagreement between the Catholic right and left over the meaning of the faith for economic
policy. Both sides staked out antithetical positions on the question of whether the Bishops had
departed from the Catholic social tradition, indulging their leftist, statist biases in their theoretical
assumptions and practical prescriptions. To my mind, the letter is firmly within CST's
communitarian tradition as it evolved in the late twentieth century United States. Even Bainbridge
acknowledges that the pastoral letter “was not too far out of step with the mainstream of Catholic
social thought.”96 Economic Justice for All is but one in a series of statements by the American
bishops that aligned them with democratic capitalism and against Marxism and socialism, but
which were also strongly pro-labor and pro-social welfare legislation, and which favored
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co-partnership between labor and capital in the governance and ownership of the means of
production, broad sharing in economic development, and amelioration of the gross inequalities in
the distribution of wealth.97 Historically, these positions linked the institutional Church in the
United States with the New Deal98 and political progressives' willingness to involve the state in
producing social and economic justice. The bishops' identification of racism and poverty as
“sinful social structures”99 also provided a philosophical basis for the shareholder activism of
Catholic religious orders who find common ground with political progressives.
The bishops' long-standing concerns, furthermore, do not express a leftist-materialist
obsession with broader distribution of wealth. Their concerns embody a Christian anthropology
that defines wealth as merely instrumental, as merely a means of creating the material conditions
under which spiritual goods can flourish. While Novak and Bainbridge presumably would agree
with that distinction, they would disagree with the corollary assumption that human flourishing is
bound up with policies supporting participatory corporate governance and prioritization of the
subjective experience of work, particularly when the state has anything to do with them. The
ubiquity of those propositions in both the encyclicals and the bishops' statements shows that they
are not the expression of secular leftist biases imported into or grafted onto CST, but rather are an
organic expression of a particular vision of the meaning of work and the nature of the human
person in community. Indeed, in all fairness, it is the strong classical liberal and libertarian biases
that Novak and Bainbridge bring to their reading of CST that is anomalous and inorganic. The
normative framework they employ for determining questions of corporate policy and law is thus
more of a challenge to than an expression of the Catholic social tradition. A corporate law scholar
seeking to employ CST's normative framework in approaching problems of corporate law and
policy thus will find their work useful and provocative, but ultimately not satisfactory.
That problem, however, reveals a second problem. While Catholic business ethicists and
economists have begun to formulate a conception of the corporate community centered on the
notion of the common good, rather than either the shareholder or stakeholder models of corporate
governance, and while Catholic activists have used the shareholder proposal mechanism to engage
corporations with pursuit of the common good, a CST/communitarian version of corporate law is
yet to emerge. A broad frame of reference exists, but translation of the abstract theological and
moral principles of CST into legal theory and specific recommendations for legal reform has not
really begun.100 There remains an element of the platitudinous about the CST communitarian
97
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vision that needs to be transformed into something more concrete. How, as Bainbridge has
pointed out, can a large public corporation be conceptualized and actualized as a community,
given the transient nature of the various kinds of interest in the corporation and its hierarchal
economic structure? If the stakeholder and shareholder models are both just different ways of
actualizing selfish interests, and do not focus on the common good that should be the corporate
goal, how do we define the nature and limits of that good, and how do we operationalize it as a
goal, recognizing the unavoidable problems of agency costs? How do we use regulatory
intervention or mandatory legal rules to achieve a reorientation of corporate governance or
corporations' sense of social responsibility without producing perverse results? Bainbridge, in
particular, has made the valuable contribution of showing the difficulties with implementation of
CST/communitarian goals in corporate law. There is a great need for theoretical imagination and
practical ingenuity in finding ways to overcome those difficulties, if CST is going to be anything
other than a challenging, but ultimately irrelevant set of religious reflections on business
organization and behavior.
I have argued that Bainbridge's reliance on the shareholder wealth maximization norm and
the contractual theory of the firm fits awkwardly with CST. His work represents, however, an
escape from the platitudinous. He has shown, in particular, how difficult it is to derive specific
guidance from CST's theological propositions and moral norms for corporate law. His criticism
of the Bishops’ letter may be most valuable in the way it shows how the move from general CST
principles to highly specific policy recommendations and prescriptions for legal change is
inherently problematic, because such recommendations and prescriptions are subject to
disagreement on prudential grounds even among people who share a Catholic perspective.
Nevertheless, if CST is going to be meaningful, it must provide a means for moving from the
general to the specific. Bainbridge has led the way in showing how that might be done in corporate
law theory. His critique of the Bishops’ letter and CST doctrine on participatory governance,
however, may be more of a fundamental criticism of basic CST precepts themselves rather than a
prudential disagreement with specific applications of those precepts. There are versions of
corporate law theory more congruent with CST’s communitarian vision than Bainbridge’s. While
wholly secular in inspiration, those versions of corporate law theory that emphasize broader
participation in corporate governance, stronger mechanisms of corporate accountability, legal
structures for corporate social responsibility, and, ultimately, rethinking of the shareholder wealth
maximization norm, provide a set of analytical tools that would help CST move from moral
exhortation to a concrete agenda for change. In return, CST would provide corporate law theory
a normative framework that would give its reform agenda greater moral and spiritual weight and
conviction.

informed about what is meant in reality by this debate?” Id. at 129.

